Tempo is the embedded pay layer for the hourly economy. Platforms that run shift and gig work add one API, and their workers get instant access to pay they have already earned, inside the platform's own app. No two-week wait, no payday loan, and no money-transmitter licence for the platform to build. The round is a $10M Series A at $34.9M pre-money, $44.9M post, for 22.3% of the company. This memo exists to give an investor what is needed to underwrite that decision: the problem, the product, the market, the model, the traction, the team, the numbers, and the terms. The cover leads with the category rather than a feature on purpose. Earned-wage access as a consumer app is a crowded, low-trust space. Tempo is infrastructure sold to platforms, which is a different business with better retention and a defensible position. Framing Tempo as a B2B2C pay rail rather than another money app changes how every later slide should be read. The traction line is the proof that this is real, not a pitch. Tempo is live with 17 platforms, about 40,000 active workers, and $210M in wages accessed to date, with a default rate under 0.4% because advances are recovered automatically at payday. Those figures anchor the rest of the memo.

Tempo is the embedded pay layer for the hourly economy. Platforms that run shift and gig work add one API, and their workers get instant access to pay they have already earned, inside the platform's own app. No two-week wait, no payday loan, and no money-transmitter licence for the platform to build.

The round is a $10M Series A at $34.9M pre-money, $44.9M post, for 22.3% of the company. This memo exists to give an investor what is needed to underwrite that decision: the problem, the product, the market, the model, the traction, the team, the numbers, and the terms.

The cover leads with the category rather than a feature on purpose. Earned-wage access as a consumer app is a crowded, low-trust space. Tempo is infrastructure sold to platforms, which is a different business with better retention and a defensible position. Framing Tempo as a B2B2C pay rail rather than another money app changes how every later slide should be read.

The traction line is the proof that this is real, not a pitch. Tempo is live with 17 platforms, about 40,000 active workers, and $210M in wages accessed to date, with a default rate under 0.4% because advances are recovered automatically at payday. Those figures anchor the rest of the memo.

The problem has two layers. First, the pay cycle itself. About 78 million Americans are paid by the hour, and most live close to the edge. More than 60% cannot cover a $400 emergency. They earn the money today and receive it in two weeks, and that gap is expensive. It pushes people into payday loans at around 400% APR and overdraft fees at about $35 a time. The drain on hourly workers is more than $100B a year, taken from the people least able to afford it. Second, the platforms that run this workforce cannot fix it easily. Gig marketplaces, staffing agencies, delivery apps and franchises know that faster pay wins and keeps workers. Building it themselves means payroll ledgers, real-time money movement, fraud and risk systems, and a money-transmitter licence in all 50 states. That is more than two years and millions of dollars before a single worker is paid faster. The apps that exist today do not solve it for the platform. Earnin, Dave and Brigit are direct to consumer. They are another login, they add nothing to the platform, and they are often as expensive as the loans they replace. Why this matters for the memo: the problem is large, measurable and structural, and the obvious fixes are blocked by cost and regulation. That is the gap Tempo fills. The figure to hold is the $100B a year lost to the space between earning and getting paid.

The problem has two layers. First, the pay cycle itself. About 78 million Americans are paid by the hour, and most live close to the edge. More than 60% cannot cover a $400 emergency. They earn the money today and receive it in two weeks, and that gap is expensive. It pushes people into payday loans at around 400% APR and overdraft fees at about $35 a time. The drain on hourly workers is more than $100B a year, taken from the people least able to afford it.

Second, the platforms that run this workforce cannot fix it easily. Gig marketplaces, staffing agencies, delivery apps and franchises know that faster pay wins and keeps workers. Building it themselves means payroll ledgers, real-time money movement, fraud and risk systems, and a money-transmitter licence in all 50 states. That is more than two years and millions of dollars before a single worker is paid faster.

The apps that exist today do not solve it for the platform. Earnin, Dave and Brigit are direct to consumer. They are another login, they add nothing to the platform, and they are often as expensive as the loans they replace.

Why this matters for the memo: the problem is large, measurable and structural, and the obvious fixes are blocked by cost and regulation. That is the gap Tempo fills. The figure to hold is the $100B a year lost to the space between earning and getting paid.

Tempo is infrastructure, not another app. A platform adds one integration and can offer instant, earned pay inside its own product. Tempo holds the licences, runs the ledger, funds the float, and prices the risk. The platform goes live in weeks, not years, and it shares in the revenue instead of paying for a cost centre. The shift the slide makes is from build or buy an app to turn on a rail. Everything a platform would have to build itself, Tempo already runs: the 50-state money-transmitter licences, the real-time ledger that tracks earnings per shift, the funding engine that fronts the advance, and the settlement that recovers it at payday. The platform never touches regulated money movement. Instant pay, built in, not bolted on. That is the whole argument. Because Tempo is embedded, the worker sees their earned balance in the app they already use, with no second login and no separate brand asking for trust. Because Tempo carries the risk and the compliance, the platform gets the retention benefit without the liability. And because Tempo pays a revenue share, instant pay becomes a source of profit for the platform rather than a line of cost. For an investor, the solution slide is where the model and the moat start. Tempo is selling a capability that is genuinely hard to replicate, and it is selling it to businesses rather than to consumers. That is a better place to stand than the consumer EWA apps, and the rest of the memo builds on it.

Tempo is infrastructure, not another app. A platform adds one integration and can offer instant, earned pay inside its own product. Tempo holds the licences, runs the ledger, funds the float, and prices the risk. The platform goes live in weeks, not years, and it shares in the revenue instead of paying for a cost centre.

The shift the slide makes is from build or buy an app to turn on a rail. Everything a platform would have to build itself, Tempo already runs: the 50-state money-transmitter licences, the real-time ledger that tracks earnings per shift, the funding engine that fronts the advance, and the settlement that recovers it at payday. The platform never touches regulated money movement.

Instant pay, built in, not bolted on. That is the whole argument. Because Tempo is embedded, the worker sees their earned balance in the app they already use, with no second login and no separate brand asking for trust. Because Tempo carries the risk and the compliance, the platform gets the retention benefit without the liability. And because Tempo pays a revenue share, instant pay becomes a source of profit for the platform rather than a line of cost.

For an investor, the solution slide is where the model and the moat start. Tempo is selling a capability that is genuinely hard to replicate, and it is selling it to businesses rather than to consumers. That is a better place to stand than the consumer EWA apps, and the rest of the memo builds on it.

The product is a set of components that together let any platform run instant pay. There are five parts. The Instant Pay API is the core. One integration renders real-time earned-wage access natively inside the platform's own interface. The Tempo Ledger tracks earnings as they accrue per shift or gig, the available balance, and the repayment, in real time. The Risk and Funding Engine fronts the float and prices risk per worker, with near-zero loss because advances are recovered automatically at payday. Compliance-as-a-Service covers 50-state money-transmitter licensing, KYC and AML, and settlement, so the platform never handles regulated money. The Tempo Card is an optional branded debit card that lets workers spend their balance at once, which drives interchange revenue and daily engagement. The point of the slide is that this is a complete system, not a feature. Each piece removes a reason a platform would otherwise have to say no. The API removes engineering effort, the ledger removes accounting complexity, the funding engine removes balance-sheet risk, and the compliance layer removes the regulatory blocker that stops most platforms cold. The Tempo Card then adds a second revenue line and a daily habit. For an investor, the product tells you two things. Tempo is defensible because the hard parts, the licences and the funding engine, sit with Tempo and compound with data. And Tempo can grow revenue per worker over time by expanding from instant pay into the card and, later, savings and wellness. The product is built to land narrow and expand.

The product is a set of components that together let any platform run instant pay. There are five parts.

The Instant Pay API is the core. One integration renders real-time earned-wage access natively inside the platform's own interface. The Tempo Ledger tracks earnings as they accrue per shift or gig, the available balance, and the repayment, in real time. The Risk and Funding Engine fronts the float and prices risk per worker, with near-zero loss because advances are recovered automatically at payday. Compliance-as-a-Service covers 50-state money-transmitter licensing, KYC and AML, and settlement, so the platform never handles regulated money. The Tempo Card is an optional branded debit card that lets workers spend their balance at once, which drives interchange revenue and daily engagement.

The point of the slide is that this is a complete system, not a feature. Each piece removes a reason a platform would otherwise have to say no. The API removes engineering effort, the ledger removes accounting complexity, the funding engine removes balance-sheet risk, and the compliance layer removes the regulatory blocker that stops most platforms cold. The Tempo Card then adds a second revenue line and a daily habit.

For an investor, the product tells you two things. Tempo is defensible because the hard parts, the licences and the funding engine, sit with Tempo and compound with data. And Tempo can grow revenue per worker over time by expanding from instant pay into the card and, later, savings and wellness. The product is built to land narrow and expand.

The mechanism is five steps, and each one maps to something Tempo does rather than something the platform does. Integrate. The platform connects Tempo through a single API or SDK. Accrue. Tempo tracks earned wages in real time as shifts and gigs complete, so the available balance is always current. Offer. Each worker sees their earned balance inside the platform's app, with no separate download. Cash out. One tap moves money instantly to any debit card or to the Tempo Card, and the fee is paid by the worker or funded by the employer. Reconcile. Tempo settles automatically on payday, so the platform never handles the money or the risk. The slide answers the first question a platform asks, which is how hard is this and what do we take on. The answer is that the integration is light and the liability stays with Tempo. The worker experience is a single tap, and the platform's exposure is close to zero because Tempo funds the advance and recovers it at source. The step that carries the economics is reconcile. Advances are recovered automatically from the next pay run, which is why the default rate is under 0.4%. That is what makes the funding engine safe to scale and what lets Tempo price the product low enough for platforms and workers to say yes. For an investor, the takeaway is that the flow is simple on the surface and heavily engineered underneath. The simplicity is what closes platforms. The engineering underneath is what protects the margin and keeps losses near zero.

The mechanism is five steps, and each one maps to something Tempo does rather than something the platform does.

Integrate. The platform connects Tempo through a single API or SDK. Accrue. Tempo tracks earned wages in real time as shifts and gigs complete, so the available balance is always current. Offer. Each worker sees their earned balance inside the platform's app, with no separate download. Cash out. One tap moves money instantly to any debit card or to the Tempo Card, and the fee is paid by the worker or funded by the employer. Reconcile. Tempo settles automatically on payday, so the platform never handles the money or the risk.

The slide answers the first question a platform asks, which is how hard is this and what do we take on. The answer is that the integration is light and the liability stays with Tempo. The worker experience is a single tap, and the platform's exposure is close to zero because Tempo funds the advance and recovers it at source.

The step that carries the economics is reconcile. Advances are recovered automatically from the next pay run, which is why the default rate is under 0.4%. That is what makes the funding engine safe to scale and what lets Tempo price the product low enough for platforms and workers to say yes.

For an investor, the takeaway is that the flow is simple on the surface and heavily engineered underneath. The simplicity is what closes platforms. The engineering underneath is what protects the margin and keeps losses near zero.

The slide compares four ways a worker can get paid early, and it is built to show that only one of them works for the platform as well as the worker. A payday loan or overdraft is the status quo. It carries predatory rates for the worker and does nothing for the platform. A direct-to-consumer earned-wage app such as Earnin or Dave charges flat but recurring fees, sits in a separate app, and gives the platform no value. Building in-house is possible, but it takes more than two years and a 50-state licence, and until it ships it is pure cost. Tempo is the fourth column. The worker pays a low flat fee or nothing when the employer funds it, the pay is embedded in the platform in weeks, Tempo holds all the licences, and the platform earns a revenue share and a retention lift. The argument is that the other three options each fail on at least one axis that matters. The loan is bad for the worker. The consumer app is neutral for the platform. The in-house build is too slow and too expensive. Tempo is the only option that is good for the worker and good for the platform at the same time. The headline is that Tempo is the only instant-pay layer a platform can turn on in weeks and actually earn from. For an investor, this is the wedge. It reframes the buying decision from a cost to a profit, which is why platforms adopt and why they stay. The comparison also sets up the competition slide later in the memo.

The slide compares four ways a worker can get paid early, and it is built to show that only one of them works for the platform as well as the worker.

A payday loan or overdraft is the status quo. It carries predatory rates for the worker and does nothing for the platform. A direct-to-consumer earned-wage app such as Earnin or Dave charges flat but recurring fees, sits in a separate app, and gives the platform no value. Building in-house is possible, but it takes more than two years and a 50-state licence, and until it ships it is pure cost. Tempo is the fourth column. The worker pays a low flat fee or nothing when the employer funds it, the pay is embedded in the platform in weeks, Tempo holds all the licences, and the platform earns a revenue share and a retention lift.

The argument is that the other three options each fail on at least one axis that matters. The loan is bad for the worker. The consumer app is neutral for the platform. The in-house build is too slow and too expensive. Tempo is the only option that is good for the worker and good for the platform at the same time.

The headline is that Tempo is the only instant-pay layer a platform can turn on in weeks and actually earn from. For an investor, this is the wedge. It reframes the buying decision from a cost to a profit, which is why platforms adopt and why they stay. The comparison also sets up the competition slide later in the memo.

This slide lists the five capabilities that make the product complete, and it reads as the answer to what exactly are we buying. The Instant Pay API is the single integration that renders earned-wage access inside the platform's own app. The Tempo Ledger is the real-time record of what each worker has earned, what is available, and what has been repaid. The Risk and Funding Engine is the balance sheet and the pricing that let Tempo front the advance and recover it safely. Compliance-as-a-Service is the licensing and the money movement that the platform would otherwise have to build. The Tempo Card is the optional debit card that turns the balance into daily spending and a second revenue line. The reason to separate features from the product story is that each feature removes a specific objection. Engineering teams worry about build effort, so the API answers that. Finance teams worry about carrying advances, so the funding engine answers that. Legal teams worry about regulation, so the compliance layer answers that. The card is the upsell that lifts revenue per worker once the core is live. For an investor, the features slide is where the ARPU story and the moat meet. The card and, later, savings and wellness are how blended revenue per active worker rises from about $5 to about $7 a month. The funding engine and the licences are the parts that are hard to copy and that improve with scale and data. These are not nice-to-haves. They are the reasons a platform integrates and the reasons a competitor cannot catch up quickly.

This slide lists the five capabilities that make the product complete, and it reads as the answer to what exactly are we buying.

The Instant Pay API is the single integration that renders earned-wage access inside the platform's own app. The Tempo Ledger is the real-time record of what each worker has earned, what is available, and what has been repaid. The Risk and Funding Engine is the balance sheet and the pricing that let Tempo front the advance and recover it safely. Compliance-as-a-Service is the licensing and the money movement that the platform would otherwise have to build. The Tempo Card is the optional debit card that turns the balance into daily spending and a second revenue line.

The reason to separate features from the product story is that each feature removes a specific objection. Engineering teams worry about build effort, so the API answers that. Finance teams worry about carrying advances, so the funding engine answers that. Legal teams worry about regulation, so the compliance layer answers that. The card is the upsell that lifts revenue per worker once the core is live.

For an investor, the features slide is where the ARPU story and the moat meet. The card and, later, savings and wellness are how blended revenue per active worker rises from about $5 to about $7 a month. The funding engine and the licences are the parts that are hard to copy and that improve with scale and data. These are not nice-to-haves. They are the reasons a platform integrates and the reasons a competitor cannot catch up quickly.

Timing is the argument that this is the right moment, not five years ago and not five years from now. Three forces line up. Labour is scarce. Platforms that run hourly work compete on how fast workers get paid, and instant pay is moving from a perk to an expectation. A platform that cannot offer it loses workers to one that can, which turns Tempo from a nice feature into a retention tool the platform needs. Regulation is turning favourable. States are formally separating earned-wage access from lending, which removes the legal grey area that made platforms and banks cautious. As the category is de-risked in law, the compliance path Tempo has already built becomes both clearer and more valuable, because Tempo holds the licences while the rules settle. The rails have matured. FedNow and RTP make instant settlement cheap and available for the first time. The plumbing that instant pay depends on now exists at national scale, so Tempo can move money in real time without building its own network or paying legacy costs. The point is that none of these were true together before. When labour was loose, platforms did not need to compete on pay speed. When the law was unclear, the risk was too high. When real-time rails did not exist, the cost was too high. All three have changed at once, and Tempo is already live through the window rather than arriving to build after it. The proof is the traction: 17 platforms, about 40,000 active workers, and $210M accessed to date. That is a market pulling the product in.

Timing is the argument that this is the right moment, not five years ago and not five years from now. Three forces line up.

Labour is scarce. Platforms that run hourly work compete on how fast workers get paid, and instant pay is moving from a perk to an expectation. A platform that cannot offer it loses workers to one that can, which turns Tempo from a nice feature into a retention tool the platform needs.

Regulation is turning favourable. States are formally separating earned-wage access from lending, which removes the legal grey area that made platforms and banks cautious. As the category is de-risked in law, the compliance path Tempo has already built becomes both clearer and more valuable, because Tempo holds the licences while the rules settle.

The rails have matured. FedNow and RTP make instant settlement cheap and available for the first time. The plumbing that instant pay depends on now exists at national scale, so Tempo can move money in real time without building its own network or paying legacy costs.

The point is that none of these were true together before. When labour was loose, platforms did not need to compete on pay speed. When the law was unclear, the risk was too high. When real-time rails did not exist, the cost was too high. All three have changed at once, and Tempo is already live through the window rather than arriving to build after it. The proof is the traction: 17 platforms, about 40,000 active workers, and $210M accessed to date. That is a market pulling the product in.

The market slide sizes the opportunity and shows Tempo is claiming a small, credible share of a large pool. The base is large. About 78 million Americans are paid by the hour, and roughly 76 million take part in gig or independent work. Earned-wage-access transaction volume in the US already runs above $30B a year and is compounding, while the pay-gap drain on workers is more than $100B a year. The demand is not hypothetical. The sizing uses three layers. TAM is $12B, the total annual fee pool across instant pay and embedded payroll for the US hourly economy. SAM is $3.5B, the platform-embedded segment, meaning the workforce platforms that would white-label pay rather than send workers to a separate app. SOM is $64M, Tempo's Year-5 revenue, which is about 1.8% of SAM. The discipline in these numbers is the point. Tempo is not claiming the whole $12B or even a large slice of the $3.5B. The Year-5 target of $64M is under 2% of the segment Tempo actually sells into, which a platform-by-platform sales motion can reach. The market is big enough that a small share is a real business, and the share being claimed is small enough to be believable. For an investor, read the market slide alongside the timing slide. The pool is large because the problem is large, the reachable part is defined by the embedded model rather than by every hourly worker, and the target share is conservative. The upside is that the same infrastructure extends to the UK and Canada later, which is not in these US-only figures.

The market slide sizes the opportunity and shows Tempo is claiming a small, credible share of a large pool.

The base is large. About 78 million Americans are paid by the hour, and roughly 76 million take part in gig or independent work. Earned-wage-access transaction volume in the US already runs above $30B a year and is compounding, while the pay-gap drain on workers is more than $100B a year. The demand is not hypothetical.

The sizing uses three layers. TAM is $12B, the total annual fee pool across instant pay and embedded payroll for the US hourly economy. SAM is $3.5B, the platform-embedded segment, meaning the workforce platforms that would white-label pay rather than send workers to a separate app. SOM is $64M, Tempo's Year-5 revenue, which is about 1.8% of SAM.

The discipline in these numbers is the point. Tempo is not claiming the whole $12B or even a large slice of the $3.5B. The Year-5 target of $64M is under 2% of the segment Tempo actually sells into, which a platform-by-platform sales motion can reach. The market is big enough that a small share is a real business, and the share being claimed is small enough to be believable.

For an investor, read the market slide alongside the timing slide. The pool is large because the problem is large, the reachable part is defined by the embedded model rather than by every hourly worker, and the target share is conservative. The upside is that the same infrastructure extends to the UK and Canada later, which is not in these US-only figures.

The model is two recurring revenue streams, both priced per active worker per month, which makes revenue predictable and tied to usage. The first stream is instant pay and interchange, blended at about $4.50 per active worker per month. This combines the transaction fees on cash-outs with interchange from the Tempo Card. The second stream is a platform fee of $2.00 per active worker per month, a straightforward SaaS charge to the platform. Together they give a blended ARPU that rises from about $5 to about $7 per active worker per month as instant-pay adoption climbs from 55% to 90%. Margin improves with scale. Gross margin moves from 61% to 75% over the plan as volume absorbs the fixed costs of processing, fraud control and compliance. The unit economics work because losses are near zero, since advances are recovered at payday, so the cost of funding the float is low and stable. The reason to price per worker rather than per transaction is that it aligns Tempo with the platform's own growth and smooths revenue. Every worker a platform adds is recurring revenue for Tempo, and every step up in adoption raises ARPU without new sales effort. The revenue share Tempo pays back to the platform comes out of this and is what turns the platform from a buyer into a partner. For an investor, the model shows two things that matter. Revenue compounds per worker as adoption and the card expand ARPU, and margin expands with scale rather than staying flat. Future lines such as savings, financial wellness and credit-building are not in the base numbers, so they are upside rather than something the plan depends on.

The model is two recurring revenue streams, both priced per active worker per month, which makes revenue predictable and tied to usage.

The first stream is instant pay and interchange, blended at about $4.50 per active worker per month. This combines the transaction fees on cash-outs with interchange from the Tempo Card. The second stream is a platform fee of $2.00 per active worker per month, a straightforward SaaS charge to the platform. Together they give a blended ARPU that rises from about $5 to about $7 per active worker per month as instant-pay adoption climbs from 55% to 90%.

Margin improves with scale. Gross margin moves from 61% to 75% over the plan as volume absorbs the fixed costs of processing, fraud control and compliance. The unit economics work because losses are near zero, since advances are recovered at payday, so the cost of funding the float is low and stable.

The reason to price per worker rather than per transaction is that it aligns Tempo with the platform's own growth and smooths revenue. Every worker a platform adds is recurring revenue for Tempo, and every step up in adoption raises ARPU without new sales effort. The revenue share Tempo pays back to the platform comes out of this and is what turns the platform from a buyer into a partner.

For an investor, the model shows two things that matter. Revenue compounds per worker as adoption and the card expand ARPU, and margin expands with scale rather than staying flat. Future lines such as savings, financial wellness and credit-building are not in the base numbers, so they are upside rather than something the plan depends on.

The go-to-market slide explains how Tempo reaches platforms and grows revenue per platform once it is in. The motion has five parts. Land mid-market platforms first, meaning staffing agencies, delivery services and gig marketplaces that want retention and can integrate quickly, so Tempo proves value fast. Partner through workforce and payroll technology, embedding via the WFM, HR and payroll systems that already sit between the platform and the worker. Lead with a revenue share rather than a bill, which flips the platform's decision from cost to profit. Land and expand, starting with instant pay and growing into the Tempo Card and then savings and wellness, so revenue per worker compounds. Move upmarket with references, using mid-market wins and worker-retention data to reach national platforms. The logic is that mid-market platforms are the fastest to close and the cheapest to serve, and they generate the proof and the data needed to win larger accounts later. Partnering through payroll and WFM systems gives Tempo distribution it does not have to build, because those systems already touch the worker. The revenue share is the reason platforms say yes, and land-and-expand is the reason revenue per platform grows after the first integration. For an investor, the slide connects to the model and the forecast. Land-and-expand is what lifts ARPU from about $5 to about $7 per worker, reference-led selling is what supports the jump to national platforms in the roadmap, and the partner channel is what keeps acquisition cost low. The distribution engine is designed to be efficient and to compound, which is what the five-year plan needs to be credible.

The go-to-market slide explains how Tempo reaches platforms and grows revenue per platform once it is in.

The motion has five parts. Land mid-market platforms first, meaning staffing agencies, delivery services and gig marketplaces that want retention and can integrate quickly, so Tempo proves value fast. Partner through workforce and payroll technology, embedding via the WFM, HR and payroll systems that already sit between the platform and the worker. Lead with a revenue share rather than a bill, which flips the platform's decision from cost to profit. Land and expand, starting with instant pay and growing into the Tempo Card and then savings and wellness, so revenue per worker compounds. Move upmarket with references, using mid-market wins and worker-retention data to reach national platforms.

The logic is that mid-market platforms are the fastest to close and the cheapest to serve, and they generate the proof and the data needed to win larger accounts later. Partnering through payroll and WFM systems gives Tempo distribution it does not have to build, because those systems already touch the worker. The revenue share is the reason platforms say yes, and land-and-expand is the reason revenue per platform grows after the first integration.

For an investor, the slide connects to the model and the forecast. Land-and-expand is what lifts ARPU from about $5 to about $7 per worker, reference-led selling is what supports the jump to national platforms in the roadmap, and the partner channel is what keeps acquisition cost low. The distribution engine is designed to be efficient and to compound, which is what the five-year plan needs to be credible.

The team slide is the case that these are the people who can ship regulated fintech at scale, because most of them have done it before. Maya Chen, co-founder and CEO, built money-movement products at Stripe and led payroll at Gusto. Daniel Okafor, co-founder and CTO, built card-issuing and ledger infrastructure at Marqeta and earlier at Plaid, and owns Tempo's real-time ledger and risk engine. Priya Raman, Head of Risk and Compliance, ran money-transmitter licensing and banking-as-a-service compliance at Cross River Bank and holds the 50-state licence map. Marcus Webb, Head of Product, built consumer fintech at Square and Chime. Sofia Alvarez, Head of Growth, scaled platform partnerships at Toast and DoorDash. James Park, Head of Engineering, ran payments reliability at Adyen. Advisors include former regulators and platform CFOs. The reason this is the right team is that Tempo's hard parts are exactly what they have already built. The product depends on real-time ledgers and card issuing, which is Okafor's background. It depends on 50-state licensing and BaaS compliance, which is Raman's. It depends on selling into platforms, which is Alvarez's. The team is not learning the problem on the investor's money. For an investor, the team slide is where execution risk is priced. The biggest risks in this business are regulatory and operational, not whether workers want faster pay. A team that has shipped payroll, held money-transmitter licences and run payments at four-nines reliability is the mitigation for those risks. The live product, with 17 platforms and $210M accessed, is the evidence that this group can build and sell the thing, not just describe it.

The team slide is the case that these are the people who can ship regulated fintech at scale, because most of them have done it before.

Maya Chen, co-founder and CEO, built money-movement products at Stripe and led payroll at Gusto. Daniel Okafor, co-founder and CTO, built card-issuing and ledger infrastructure at Marqeta and earlier at Plaid, and owns Tempo's real-time ledger and risk engine. Priya Raman, Head of Risk and Compliance, ran money-transmitter licensing and banking-as-a-service compliance at Cross River Bank and holds the 50-state licence map. Marcus Webb, Head of Product, built consumer fintech at Square and Chime. Sofia Alvarez, Head of Growth, scaled platform partnerships at Toast and DoorDash. James Park, Head of Engineering, ran payments reliability at Adyen. Advisors include former regulators and platform CFOs.

The reason this is the right team is that Tempo's hard parts are exactly what they have already built. The product depends on real-time ledgers and card issuing, which is Okafor's background. It depends on 50-state licensing and BaaS compliance, which is Raman's. It depends on selling into platforms, which is Alvarez's. The team is not learning the problem on the investor's money.

For an investor, the team slide is where execution risk is priced. The biggest risks in this business are regulatory and operational, not whether workers want faster pay. A team that has shipped payroll, held money-transmitter licences and run payments at four-nines reliability is the mitigation for those risks. The live product, with 17 platforms and $210M accessed, is the evidence that this group can build and sell the thing, not just describe it.

The competitive slide places Tempo against the field and shows where it stands alone. The players fall into groups. Earnin, Dave and Brigit are direct-to-consumer apps. DailyPay, Payactiv and Branch are employer-side earned-wage access. Wagestream, Clair and Rain are closer to embedded. The 2x2 plots two axes, direct-to-consumer app against embedded infrastructure on one, and narrow feature against full compliance and funding on the other. Tempo sits in the top-right corner, embedded infrastructure with full 50-state compliance and its own funding engine. The claim is that no one else combines all three of embedded, fully licensed, and self-funded. Consumer apps are not embedded and give the platform nothing. Employer EWA providers are closer but tend to be narrower and do not offer the platform a revenue share. The embedded-ish players lack either the full compliance stack or the funding engine. Tempo is the only one a platform can white-label and also earn from. The moat has three sources. The regulatory licences are hard and slow to replicate. The risk and funding engine improves with data, so it gets cheaper and more accurate as volume grows. And the platform revenue-share creates lock-in, because a platform that earns from Tempo and has embedded it in its own app has little reason to rip it out. For an investor, this is the durability argument. It is not enough to be first or fastest if a larger player can copy the product. Tempo's answer is that the parts that matter, the licences, the funding data, and the embedded revenue relationship, compound and stick. That is what protects the pricing and the share assumed in the forecast.

The competitive slide places Tempo against the field and shows where it stands alone.

The players fall into groups. Earnin, Dave and Brigit are direct-to-consumer apps. DailyPay, Payactiv and Branch are employer-side earned-wage access. Wagestream, Clair and Rain are closer to embedded. The 2x2 plots two axes, direct-to-consumer app against embedded infrastructure on one, and narrow feature against full compliance and funding on the other. Tempo sits in the top-right corner, embedded infrastructure with full 50-state compliance and its own funding engine.

The claim is that no one else combines all three of embedded, fully licensed, and self-funded. Consumer apps are not embedded and give the platform nothing. Employer EWA providers are closer but tend to be narrower and do not offer the platform a revenue share. The embedded-ish players lack either the full compliance stack or the funding engine. Tempo is the only one a platform can white-label and also earn from.

The moat has three sources. The regulatory licences are hard and slow to replicate. The risk and funding engine improves with data, so it gets cheaper and more accurate as volume grows. And the platform revenue-share creates lock-in, because a platform that earns from Tempo and has embedded it in its own app has little reason to rip it out.

For an investor, this is the durability argument. It is not enough to be first or fastest if a larger player can copy the product. Tempo's answer is that the parts that matter, the licences, the funding data, and the embedded revenue relationship, compound and stick. That is what protects the pricing and the share assumed in the forecast.

The roadmap sets out three phases and ties each to a clear operating goal. Phase one, Prove, runs through 2027. Tempo takes the US instant-pay API to general availability, grows from 17 to 100 platforms, moves from about 40,000 to roughly 120,000 active workers, launches the Tempo Card in beta, and lands its first national platform. Phase two, Scale, covers 2028 and 2029. Active workers grow from about 300,000 toward 600,000, Tempo launches savings and financial wellness, enters the UK, and raises a $30M Series B to fund licensing and float. Phase three, Platform, spans 2030 and 2031. Active workers pass one million, Tempo adds embedded credit-building, enters Canada, and reaches EBITDA-positive as it becomes the financial operating system for hourly workers. The sequence is deliberate. Prove the US model and the card first, then add revenue lines and a second country, then expand the product into credit and a third market once the base is large. Each phase adds either scale, a new revenue line, or a new geography, and the Series B sits at the start of Year 3 to fund the licensing and float that scale requires. For an investor, the roadmap is where the forecast and the funding plan connect. The worker counts here match the model, roughly 120,000 by the end of the Prove phase and past a million by the end of the plan. The Series B is signposted rather than assumed away, so the dilution and capital needs are visible. The roadmap is a plan to compound the same infrastructure across more workers, more products and more countries, not a plan that depends on a new bet at each stage.

The roadmap sets out three phases and ties each to a clear operating goal.

Phase one, Prove, runs through 2027. Tempo takes the US instant-pay API to general availability, grows from 17 to 100 platforms, moves from about 40,000 to roughly 120,000 active workers, launches the Tempo Card in beta, and lands its first national platform. Phase two, Scale, covers 2028 and 2029. Active workers grow from about 300,000 toward 600,000, Tempo launches savings and financial wellness, enters the UK, and raises a $30M Series B to fund licensing and float. Phase three, Platform, spans 2030 and 2031. Active workers pass one million, Tempo adds embedded credit-building, enters Canada, and reaches EBITDA-positive as it becomes the financial operating system for hourly workers.

The sequence is deliberate. Prove the US model and the card first, then add revenue lines and a second country, then expand the product into credit and a third market once the base is large. Each phase adds either scale, a new revenue line, or a new geography, and the Series B sits at the start of Year 3 to fund the licensing and float that scale requires.

For an investor, the roadmap is where the forecast and the funding plan connect. The worker counts here match the model, roughly 120,000 by the end of the Prove phase and past a million by the end of the plan. The Series B is signposted rather than assumed away, so the dilution and capital needs are visible. The roadmap is a plan to compound the same infrastructure across more workers, more products and more countries, not a plan that depends on a new bet at each stage.

The forecast is a five-year plan starting in January 2027, and it shows a business that scales revenue quickly and turns profitable in Year 5. Revenue runs $1.2M in Year 1, $5.4M in Year 2, $15.0M in Year 3, $34.3M in Year 4, and $64.0M in Year 5. Gross margin improves across the plan from 61% to 75%. EBITDA is negative in the early years, at minus $3.0M, minus $5.0M, minus $6.2M and minus $2.1M, then turns positive in Year 5 at plus $11.8M, an 18% margin. Active workers at year-end grow from 39,000 to 123,000, 298,000, 601,000 and 1.03 million. Cash at close stays positive throughout, from $7.0M after the Series A to $35.3M by Year 5, with a planned $30M Series B at the start of Year 3. The shape of the plan is the story. Revenue compounds because it is recurring per worker and ARPU rises as adoption and the card expand. Losses shrink each year as gross margin climbs and fixed costs are absorbed, and the business crosses into profit in Year 5 rather than promising it beyond the horizon. Cash never goes negative, and the one external dependency, the Series B, is placed where the model shows it is needed. For an investor, read the forecast against the traction and the model. The revenue path is built from platforms and workers that are already being added, the margin path follows the unit economics, and the profit in Year 5 is modest and specific rather than heroic. The numbers here match the roadmap and the ask, so the whole memo tells one consistent story.

The forecast is a five-year plan starting in January 2027, and it shows a business that scales revenue quickly and turns profitable in Year 5.

Revenue runs $1.2M in Year 1, $5.4M in Year 2, $15.0M in Year 3, $34.3M in Year 4, and $64.0M in Year 5. Gross margin improves across the plan from 61% to 75%. EBITDA is negative in the early years, at minus $3.0M, minus $5.0M, minus $6.2M and minus $2.1M, then turns positive in Year 5 at plus $11.8M, an 18% margin. Active workers at year-end grow from 39,000 to 123,000, 298,000, 601,000 and 1.03 million. Cash at close stays positive throughout, from $7.0M after the Series A to $35.3M by Year 5, with a planned $30M Series B at the start of Year 3.

The shape of the plan is the story. Revenue compounds because it is recurring per worker and ARPU rises as adoption and the card expand. Losses shrink each year as gross margin climbs and fixed costs are absorbed, and the business crosses into profit in Year 5 rather than promising it beyond the horizon. Cash never goes negative, and the one external dependency, the Series B, is placed where the model shows it is needed.

For an investor, read the forecast against the traction and the model. The revenue path is built from platforms and workers that are already being added, the margin path follows the unit economics, and the profit in Year 5 is modest and specific rather than heroic. The numbers here match the roadmap and the ask, so the whole memo tells one consistent story.

The ask is a $10M Series A at $35.2M pre-money, $45.2M post, for 22.1% of the company. The slide sets out what the money buys and what it is meant to prove. The use of funds is split four ways. Engineering and product take 40%, to build out the ledger, the Tempo Card, and savings. Go to market and partnerships take 25%, for sales, platform integrations and payroll partners. Licensing and compliance take 20%, to extend 50-state coverage and lay UK groundwork. Risk capital and float take 15%, to fund advances as volume scales. The milestones this raise is meant to hit are 100 platforms, 300,000 active workers, and a revenue run-rate of about $15M, with a clear path to the profitable Year 5. Those are the same figures that appear in the roadmap and the forecast, so the ask underwrites a plan the rest of the memo has already laid out rather than a separate promise. The allocation matches the risks. The largest share goes to product because the card and savings drive the ARPU expansion in the model. Compliance is funded because the licences are the moat and the gate to new markets. Float is funded because the funding engine is what lets Tempo scale advances safely. Go to market is funded to convert the pipeline that takes Tempo from 17 to 100 platforms. For an investor, the ask closes the memo by connecting price, plan and proof. Tempo is already live with 17 platforms, about 40,000 workers and $210M accessed, the $10M funds the specific steps to 100 platforms and a $15M run-rate, and the Series B is signposted for Year 3. The terms, the use of funds and the milestones are one coherent picture.

The ask is a $10M Series A at $35.2M pre-money, $45.2M post, for 22.1% of the company. The slide sets out what the money buys and what it is meant to prove.

The use of funds is split four ways. Engineering and product take 40%, to build out the ledger, the Tempo Card, and savings. Go to market and partnerships take 25%, for sales, platform integrations and payroll partners. Licensing and compliance take 20%, to extend 50-state coverage and lay UK groundwork. Risk capital and float take 15%, to fund advances as volume scales.

The milestones this raise is meant to hit are 100 platforms, 300,000 active workers, and a revenue run-rate of about $15M, with a clear path to the profitable Year 5. Those are the same figures that appear in the roadmap and the forecast, so the ask underwrites a plan the rest of the memo has already laid out rather than a separate promise.

The allocation matches the risks. The largest share goes to product because the card and savings drive the ARPU expansion in the model. Compliance is funded because the licences are the moat and the gate to new markets. Float is funded because the funding engine is what lets Tempo scale advances safely. Go to market is funded to convert the pipeline that takes Tempo from 17 to 100 platforms.

For an investor, the ask closes the memo by connecting price, plan and proof. Tempo is already live with 17 platforms, about 40,000 workers and $210M accessed, the $10M funds the specific steps to 100 platforms and a $15M run-rate, and the Series B is signposted for Year 3. The terms, the use of funds and the milestones are one coherent picture.